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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE S,_f ATE OF UTAH 
PA R L E Y )lORTEXSU:\ an<l 
EDITH i\IOHTENSON. i1ts "·ii'(', 
ROY l\lORTEN SON a1HI \' F,JL\ 
~IORTENSON, his wife 
Plaintiff's r111d Urs,1i,,11drnls, 
\' s. 
FINANCIAL URO\\''l'll. I :\l'., 
PROFESSION AL l: .:\ 1 T E D 
REALTY, FLOYD E. BENTOX 
and GLEN H. ~1ILNEB, 
Defcnda11ls (///(/ • J;JJJcl/"11/s. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 
11343 
STATEl\IENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is a suit for a judgment declaring that the 
defeudant, J;"'inancial Growth. Inc. had breached a 
agreement for the installment sale of real property and 
that the plaintiffs have the right to terminate such 
agreement. 
1 
DISPOSITION IK LO\VER COURT 
The trial l'.ourt granted Uw plaintiffs' mutio11 for 
a summary judgment dedariug thai- the agreement had 
been brearhe<l, an<l that the plaintiffs have a right to 
terminate it, and <lismissing the defendants' counter-
claim. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respoudents seek affirmance of the declaratory 
judgment. 
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS 
The appellants' statement of facts is confusing, 
is nut based upon or referenced to the record and is not 
confined to the issues before the trial court and before 
this court. The respondents submit the following state-
ment. 
The respondents, hereinafter referred to as the 
"Sellers., and the appellant, Financial Growth, Inc., 
hereinafter referred to as the "Buyer," entered into an 
agreement dated August 25, 1U67, (R. 4-42) for the 
sale of real property in ~Jorgan County, Utah, which 
included some 14,000 acres of land, a home, grazing 
rights and ,._,·ater rights. The sales price was $537,000.00, 
to be adjusted up or down depending on the actual 
acreage after a title search ( R. 6) . The contract pro-
2 
rnles for pa ymcn l of $:3,000.00 earnest mo11ey 11 po11 
1·xecution of the agr{'erne11t awl ~13~, 7;w.oo 011 Dec..eu1-
hcr I, HW7 " (or au adj uste<l amount as a nsult of 
acreage adj ustme11t as above provided) ... The prmcipal 
halancf' is to he paid in fi'"e years in installments ot 
*70,~5.i.oo eaeh year with 5~c interest on the deferred 
amount from December l, HJ<i7. There is a in·ovisio11 ior 
adjustment of lhe amount of the annual payments due 
I<! a ere age adj 11stmen ts. ( H. I), 7 ) There is a provision 
for land release. \Ve quote: 
"RELEASE: Buyer \\'ill nut receive any 
land nor land release credit for the $155,700 pay-
meut; hO\rever, thereafter, for each dollar of 
principal reduction made awl on condition that 
the Buyer is not in default, Buyer, on request, 
may have property in mutually satisfactory 
parcels consistent with the following: . . . " 
(There follows detailed pro,·isions regarding 
such parcels. ( R. 8-10) -
"SALES CO_M.:\IISSION: The sales com-
mission is to be paid by the Buyer in accordance 
with the agreemeut between the Buyer and Pro-
fessional United llealtv and its broker, Glen R. 
Jlilner and agent, Fl<;y<l E. Benton. The sales 
commission is Twenty-Eight Thousand Two 
Hundred and Sixty-Fi,-e Dollars ($28,265.00). 
Seller is to pa~· 110 real estate sales commission 
whatsoe,·er and Floyd E. Benton waives any 
and all claims he ma~· han~ against the Sellers 
or any of them arising nut of this transaction or 
any prior listiug agreement in co1~!1ectio11 with 
the sale of the :Mortenson property. (R. 10, 11) 
J 
The agreement provides that the possession date 
is December l, 1907 .... As to the conveyance the agree-
ment proddes: 
'·DEED: The deed or deeds shall be good and 
sufficient warrauty deed or deeds and shall be 
in proper form fo~ recording and shall be duly 
e.\ccuted and ack 11ow I edged by Sellers so as to 
convey to Purchaser the fee simple title to said 
propert~· free au<l clear of all liens and encum-
hrallces except as stated iu thjs Agreement. The 
<lced shall he delivered with the necessary U nite<l 
States Documentary stamps attached thereto 
upon receipt of the payments provided herein." 
(R. 11, 12) 
Tlie following significant provision relates to the 
nature of the title to be conveyed, to liens and encum-
brances and to proof of title. 
"CCHE OF ~-:NCl-:MllERANCES AND 
LIENS: If Seller shall be unable to deliver or 
cause to he delivered a deed or deeds conveying 
the fee simple title to the property, free of all 
lie11s and encumbrances except as herein stated, 
and if Purchaser shall not exercise the privilege 
(which Purchaser shall have) of waiving the 
liens and encumbrances which shall be the basis 
of such inability and accept the title in its then 
condition without diminution of the purchase 
price and without claim or demand against 
Seller, then thf' aforesaid payments made by 
Purchaser to Seller, shall be refunded without 
interest to Purchaser. and each and all of the 
other obligations of the parties hereto under this 
Agreement shall thereupon cease, except that 
Seller mar, if it so elects. haYe the privilege and 
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optio11 l(1 adjourn the time for delivery of die 
<leul for a period or periods uot exceediug m the 
aggregate ni11ety ( 90) days in order to afford 
Seller an opportuuily to cure or remo\·e any lieu 
or cucumLraucc which shall be the basis of such 
iuability, I \ll'chascr.s obligatio11s under this 
..1.\greement meamvhilc to remain in full force 
an<l effed co11ti11gc11l upon such ruring or re-
moval within such time." ( R. 12-13) 
''1\ BS TH /t CT OH TITLE lNSUll-
AN CE: Seller agrees to furnish an abstract 
brought to elate, or at Seller's option, a policy of 
title insurance in the name of the Purchaser." 
(R. 15) 
The complaiut filed J a11uary 17, 1968, alleges the 
making of the agreement, the provision for payment 
of $152,730.00 on December 1, 1967, and the failure 
of the Buyer to pay. It is further alleged that the 
Sellers have good and sufficient title as disclosed by 
abstracts delivered to the Buyer's agent in 1966, that 
~259.00 had beeu spent by the Sellers for a preliminary 
title search, that the search showed that the Sellers had 
more than sufficient acreage to perform the contract, 
that Sellers had informed Buyer's counsel that legal 
descriptions were available for cxami11atiun and that 
"if monies were placed in escrow tu cover the December 
1, 1967, installment payment the Sellers would procure 
title insurance." That au iterim title iusurance binder 
commitment has beei1 <lelin;rc<l to the Buyer and "no 
payment nor escrow deposit has been made relatiYe to 
thr December l, 1U67 payment." The prayer is for a 
judgment deiermining that the agreemenl has been 
s 
breached and tha l the Sellers have a right to terminate 
the agreement. The second paragraph prays for the 
recovery of costs and disbursements, $259.00 for thr 
title search and for a reasonable attorneys fee. ( H. 
2, 3) 
The answer of the Buyer and Professional Gnited 
Realty hereinafter referred to as the "Broker" denies 
the allegation that the agreement was breached by the 
Buyer, denies that the Seller has "good and sufficient 
title,'' denies that Floyd E. Benton had been requested 
lo return abstracts, denies for lack of information the 
cost of the title search and denies that it cost $259.00. 
Such defendants admit that "there may be sufficient 
acreage to perform said contract but allege that this 
in and of itself is not sufficient to constitute compliance 
by plaintiffs." The defendants admit all other allega-
tions of the complaint. ( R. 43, 44). 
For an affirmative defense it is alleged that the 
liuyers have at all times stood ready to perform upon 
the condition that the Sellers would "guarantee and 
provide good and sufficient fee simple title to said 
property," and that the Sellers do not own the fee 
simple title because of the "reservation of certain 
mineral rights." 
The counterclaim is for the recovery of a real 
estate commission based on an attached farm listing 
dated Februarv 26, 1966, for the sale of 13,890 acres 
for $582,300.00 (much of which is illegible) and an 
earnest money receipt and agreement dated April 25, 
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HHW, for the sale of 13,280 acres for $582,;jOU.OO tu 
Beehive Development Co., Inc. There is no allegation 
that this earnest money agreement was executed liy 
the Sellers nor ever resulted in a sale. The contrary 
must be assumed because it is alleged .. subsequently, 
the defendant Professional L nilcd ilealty was able to 
obtain an offer to purchase said property from Financial 
G-rowth, lnc., a Ilawaiian corporation, authorized to 
<lo business in Utah. Pursuant to the last mentioned 
offer to purchase the sales agreement appended to the 
complaint was executed by the parties." 
The counterclaim further alleges that Financial 
G-rowth has stood ready to perform but has been pre-
vented from doing so by the misrepresentations of the 
Seller as to the mineral rights and further that the 
Sellers further delayed "the conclusion of this trans-
action by failing to acquire timely interest in certain 
acreage involved and failing to certify such acquisition 
to the Defendants." "The Defendants are entitled to a 
commission of $58,000.oo" which has been "reduced to 
~28,000.00 by subsequent oral agreement of the parties." 
The prayer is for judgment against the Sellers and in 
favor of the Broker. Professional United Realty. (R. 
t4, 45). 
The Sellers replied admitting the execution of the 
farming listing b,,. Parley :\lorte11son only, admitting 
there was an offer to purchase dated April 2.5, I 91)6, 
arlmitted the execution of the agreement attached to the 
co111plaint. and nrlmitted thal in 51ome patents from the 
United States and the State of Utah oil, gas, coal and 
other mineral rights are reserved. It is alleged that the 
Buyers had actual or constructive notice of the reserva-
tions. The other allegations in the counterclaim are 
denied. ( R. 55, 56) 
The Buyers filed a motion for a summary judg-
ment worded as follows: 
"Come now the plaintiffs above named and 
moYc the above entitled court for an order grant-
ing to the plaintiffs a summary judgment 
against the defendants and each of them declar-
ing that the real estate co11tract described in the 
complaiut has been breached by the defendant, 
Financial Growth, Inc., and that the plaintiffs 
have a right to terminate said agreement. Plain-
tiffs further pray for a summary judgment dis-
missing the counter-claim of the defendants, 
Firnmcial Growth, Lie. and Professional United 
Realty. 
This motion is made upon the ground that 
there is no genuine issue of fact between the 
plaintiffs and any of the defendants. 
This motion is based upon the files and records 
herein and upon the affidavit of Parley .Morten-
son attached hereto and made a part hereof." 
(R. 57) 
The affidavit of Parley :Mortenson states that 
demand was made on the Buyer for payment of the 
installment due December 1, 1967, in the amount of 
$152,730.00 and it was refused and that no payment 
has been made e>.cept $3,000.00 paid about the date of 
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execution of the agreement. It is further stated that the 
Seller has at all times been and now is ready, able aud 
willing to perform all obligatious of the Seller as and 
when they become due. ( R. 59, 60). 
The affidavit of Floyd E. Benton in behalf of 
Professional United Realty, Inc. states that the farm 
listing agreement was executed by one of the plaintiffs, 
that a11 offer to purchase was obtained from Beehive 
Development Co., that said Buyer was ready, able and 
willing to perform according to the offer to sell but that 
said sale was not consumated through no fa ult of the 
Broker. It recites that subsequently the Broker ha<l 
obtained a second offer to purchase the same property 
from Financial Growth, Inc. (the Buyer) who was 
ready, willing and able to perform. That the Broker 
has earned and is entitled to receive a commission not-
withsta.ndfog any difficulty which may have arisen 
between the Seller and the Buyer. 
l t should be noted that a man named Perry Holley 
signed the Earnest .i\'Ioney Jleceipt and Off er to Pur-
chase in behalf of Beehive Development Co., Inc. as 
"president," (R. 47) and also the agreement dated 
August 25, 1967, for Financial Growth, Inc. as "agent 
and advisor." (R. 16). 
The trial court made an order granting the motion 
for &ummary judgment which reads as follows; 
"The plaintiffs' Motion for Summary J udg-
ment h;:n1ng come on regularly for hea!ing be-· 
fore the above entitled court on ~lay 3, 1968, 
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and on June 27, 1968, the court having heard 
argument of counsel and being fuily advised in 
the premises, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS ORDEHED that the plaintiffs' l\'Iotion 
for Summary Judgment be and it is hereby 
granted." ( R. 65) . 
STATE_MENT OF POINTS 
1. The judgment declaring a breach of contract 
and a right to termination is fuUy supported by the 
record and the law. 
2. The counterclaim was properly dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE JUDGMENT DECLARING A 
BREACH OF CONTRACT AND A RIGHT TO 
TERl\Il:NATlON IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY 
THE RECORD AND THE LAW. 
It will be noted that Rule .56 (a) permits the 
plaintiff to file a motion for a summary judgment in 
his favor "upon alI or any part of a claim." 
Rule 56 ( c) so far as -pertinent here provides: 
" ... The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if _the pleadings~ depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, a~d. admissions on file, to-
gether with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law .... " -
10 
In the case of Bullock v. Deseret Dodge True/.; 
Center, 11 Utah 2d. 1, 354 P.2d. 559 after referri1w 
0 
to the words of tl1e rule stated above lhe court sai<l: 
"Such showing must preclude all reasonable 
possibility that the loser could, if given a trial, 
produce evidence which would reasonably sus-
tain a judgment in his favor .... " 
l t will be noted that the Sellers filed their motion 
for the following relief: ( l) a declaration that the 
Buyer had breached the agreement, ( 2) that the Sellers 
have a right to terminate it, and ( 3) dismissal of the 
counterclaim. We will confine our argument to the 
issues presented by the motion for summary judgment. 
The agreement, under the heading "Payment" 
required the Buyer to pay to the Seller $152,730.00 on 
December I, 1967. (R. 7). It is not denied in the answer 
that the payment was not made (R. 43) and the 
statement in the affidavit of Parley Mortenson attached 
to the motion for summary judgment that the payment 
had not been made (R. 59) is not controverted in the 
only counter affidavit filed by any defendant. (R. 63, 
64) . The failure to make the initial payment must 
therefore be considered admitted. By inference, the 
failure to pay is admitted in appellants' brief, p. II. 
The Buyer's sole excuse for failure to pay is that 
s01ne of the land· was subject" to mineral reservations. 
See Answer (R. 44) ~nd Counterclaim (R. 45). 
In the cf:ise. of lVoodarq v. Alle!L, 1 Utah 2d~_ 220, 
265 P.2d 398, this court had before it a similar situation. 
11 
The plaintiff and defendant made an agreement for 
the sale of property and the def endaut delivered a check 
for $500.00 as a down payment and agreed to pay an 
a<lditional $27 ,000.00 in one month. The defendant 
made several objections to the agreement and stopped 
payment on his check. The plaintiff sued. In his 
amended answer the defendaut questioned the market-
ability of the plaintiff's title. This court held: 
" ... Defendant's attack 011 the marketability 
of plaintiffs title was premature, since, under 
the authorities, that fact is determinable, not as 
of the <late of execution of the contract, but as of 
the time a Yendee tenders that which, under the 
contract, would require the vendor to transfer 
uot only marketable title, but the title which the 
latter agreed to cmIYey. 
II ere the defendant reneged in 24 hours, a 
month before the second payment was due, and 
5 years before the plaintiffs could demand final 
payment, neither tendering nor evidencing an 
inclination to pay any further sum under the 
contract. Under these facts, plaintiffs were not 
obliged to prove marketable title simply because 
defendant raised the point. . . . " 
There is nothing in the record in the present case 
which would require the Seller to transfer a marketable 
title or would entitle tbe Buyer to raise a question on 
the reserved mineral rights or to raise any other title 
question until the Seller was obligated to deliver a deed. 
Under the heading "Release" (R. 8) the agreement is 
crystal clear that the Buyer is not entitled to a deed to 
any land upon payment of the first $155, 730.00 which 
12 
amount is the $3,000.00 payment plus the payment of 
$1.5~,730.00 due on December 1, 1967. 
For other cases holding that the Buyer's excuse for 
non payment of the installment is without merit see: 
Naylor v. Jolley, 100 Utah 130, 111 P.2d. 142. 
Coughran v. Bigelow (Utah), 164 U.S. 801, 41 
L. Ed. 442. 
92 C.J.S. p. 83. 
It will be noted that in the affidavit of Parley 
Mortenson attached to the motion for a summary judg-
ment it is stated that the Seller made demand on the 
purchaser for payment of the December 1, 1967 install-
ment in the amount of $152,730.00 and payment was 
refused. The affidavit is dated April 26, 1968. (R. 59) 
The facts stated therein are not disputed. 
It is the law that a refusal by the buyer to perform 
an executory contract of sale of land warrants a ter-
mination. 
91 C.J.S. 1071. 
Under elementary rules of contract law the Seller 
has a right to terminate an executory contract because 
of the substantial non-performance or breach of the 
Buyer. 
17A C.J.S. p. 516. 
The question as to what constitutes a substantial 
breach depends upon the peculiar circumstances of each 
13 
case. It is said that a breach must go to the root of the 
contract. 
17.A C.J .S. pp. 518, 519. 
\ V illiston <liscusses and states the rule as follows: 
""Nevertheless there arc mauy cases where the 
injured party is content merely tu terminate 
his legal relations with the other party to the 
contract without more. That he may do this 
seems clearly established both in England and 
in the United States .... This right may become 
o±~ great importance if the contract while it 
exists, operates as a threatened liability or a 
cloud on title .. , 5 vVilliston on Contracts pp. 
4100, 4101. Res Contracts, Sec. 410. 
"In truth rescission is imposed in invitum by 
the law at the option of the injured party, and 
it should be, and in general is, allowed not only 
for repudiatiou or total inability, but also for 
any breach of contract of so material and sub-
stantial a nature as would constitute a defense 
to an action brought by the party in default for 
a refusal to proceed with the contract." 5 Willis-
ton on Contracts, Rev. Ed. p. 4106. 
The answer does not allege that the Buyer has 
tendered the first installment paymeut or is ready, 
willing or able to perform in accordance with the con-
tract, nor is it stated in any pleading nor is it argued 
that there was not a repudiation of the agreement by the 
Buyer. 
The payment of $152,730.00 at the time possession 
is to be deliYered certainly goes to the root of the con-
14 
tract withiu the meaning of the rules quoted above, and 
would certainly constitute a defense to an action i'iled 
by party in default within the meaning of the rule stated 
h~' \V illiston. 
The failure of the Buyer to pay the first install-
ment under the circumstances set out in the contract 
entitles the Seller to terminate the contract. The im-
portant circumstances in addition to non-payment on 
the due dak which justify termination include the 
following: 
(a) The refusal of the Buyer to pay based on the 
usual reservations in land patents of oil and minerals. 
(R. 44, 56} 
(b) The large purchase price $537,000.00 and the 
small down payment, or as it is referred to in the 
agreement, "earnest money." (R. 6) 
( c) The provision that possession was to be de-
livered on December 1, 1967. ( R. 11 ) 
(d) The agreement that the Sellers would attempt 
to sell their livestock before December l, 1967. (R. 11) 
( e) The requirement that the winter range be 
leased if the livestock are not sold by December 1, 1967. 
(R. 11) 
(f) The requirement that the livestock be removed 
from the real property by December 1, 1968. (R. 11) 
( g) The fact that the ranch property was a home 
15 
for livestock which fluctuate in price and are perishable. 
(R. 11) 
( h) The agreement does not require the c01n-ey-
ance of the oil and mineral rights with the land but 
requires only that title be conveyed free of all hens 
and encumbrances. ( H. 12) The excuse based on reser-
vations of oil and mineral rights was an afterthought 
to justify non-payment of the installment. 
"The fact that time is of the essence of a con-
tract may appear from the nature of the property 
or the objects which the parties had in view." 91 
C.J.S. p. 1004. 
The circumstances set out above show that time 
of payment is of the essence of the contract. 
The Buyer contends that the motion for summary 
judgment should not have been granted because the 
pleadings present "bona fide issues of material facts," 
as follows: 
( 1) The issue as to whether the Sellers had good 
and sufficient title. (App. Br. 6). 
(2) 'Vho should pay the costs and disbursements. 
(App. Br. 7, 8). 
( 3) 'Vhether or nut Parley .:Mortenson was a 
partner. (App. Br. 8). 
( 4) Whether the real estate broker had obtained 
a buyer ready, willing and able to perform. (App. 
Br. 8), 
16 
( 5) 'Vhether the Sellers failed to obtain a timely 
interest in certain acreage involved. (App. Br. 8). 
In view of the fact that the motion for summary 
judgment is confined to the issues as to whether there 
was a breach of contract, the right of the Sellers to 
terminate and the dismissal of the counterclaim, the 
issues numbered (1), (2), (3), and (5) had no im-
portance in the trial court nor before this Court. 
Further, as to the issue regarding the obligation of the 
Buyer to pay certain title costs of $259.00, that is not 
of any importance in the consideration of the issues 
raised by the motion. The claim in the appellants' brief 
pp. 17-19 that the trial court should have ordered the 
refund to the Buyer of the $3,000.00 paid on the agree-
ment was not pleaded, was not argued in the trial court 
and was for the first time argued on appeal. It is also 
a matter which is not within the issues raised by the 
motion. 
The issue ( 3) regarding the counterclaim is dis-
cussed under the next heading. 
2. THE COUNTERCLAI~I WAS PROP-
ERLY DISl\'IISSED. 
The counterclaim of Professional United Realty 
for $~8,000.00 is based upon a farm listing agreement 
dated February 26, 1966. It does not mention Profes-
sional United Realty but is accepted by Floyd E. 
Renton. It is a listing for six months. The earnest money 
offer from Beehive Development Co. dated April 25, 
17 
1966, was not accepted. It is pl~inly inferred in para-
graph 2 of the counterclaim that this offer was aban-
doned in favor of the offer of Financial Growth, Inc. 
It is significant that one Perry Holley signed as 
president of Beehive and as "agent and advisor" of 
Financial Growth, Inc. ( R. 16 and 47) . The first of fer 
never having Leen accepted, the agreement v.•ith Finan-
cial Growth, J nc. being dated about one year after the 
Floyd E. Benton listing expired, and there being no 
listing with Professional United Realty or any assign-
ment from Benton to the counterclaimant, it is obvious 
that the counterclaim was properly dismissed. 
Also, it should be noted that the agreement in suit 
upon which the counterclaim for commission was based 
provides on pp. 10 and 11 as follows: 
"SALES COl\'11\IISSlON: The sales com-
mission is to be paid by the Buyer in accordance 
with the Agreement between Buyer and Profes-
sional United Realty and its broker, Glen R. 
.Milner, and agent, Floyd E. Benton. The sales 
commission is Twenty-Eight Thousand Two 
Hundred and Sixty-Five Dollars ($28,265.00). 
Seller is to pay no real estate sales commission 
whatsoever and Floyd E. Benton waives any 
and all claims he may have against the Sellers 
or any of them arising out of this transaction 
or any prior listing agreement in connection with 
the sale of the :Mortenson property." 
There is no pleading or statement by affidavit that 
the agreement between the Buyer and the real estate 
broker did not exist or should be disregarded. It is con-
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elusive that the Broker agreed to take its commission 
from the Buyer and expressly waived any claim again -:t 
the Seller. Floyd E. Benton is referred to in the com-
plaint as "purchasers agent," ( R. 2) and this is not 
denied in the answer. (R. 43). The fact that Profes-
sional United Realty did not sign the agreement which 
it is claimed is the fruit of its labor has no significance 
in Yiew of the foregoing facts. 
CONCLUSION 
The motion for summary judgment confined as it 
was to the issues of breach of the agreement dated 
August 25, 1967, the right of the Sellers to terminate 
such agreement, and the dismissal of the counterclaim 
was properly granted because there were no genuine 
issues of fact as to such matters raised by the pleadings 
or controverted by affidavit. The plaintiffs were as a 
matter of law entitled to the relief granted. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
MILO S. MARSDEN 
E. J. SKEEN 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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